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Abstract
This article argues that legal determinations of filiation are normative ideological constructions about how
societal relations between parents and children should be ordered. They am based upon particular
understandings of the relationship between biological and social facts and, as this article demonstrates,
operate to create an asymmetrical relationship between the categories between paternity and maternity I
suggest that fairly recent developments in reproductive and genetic filiation have been made and offer the
potential for an expanded understanding of relatedness or kinship which does not take the two-parent-one of
each sex-model of the family as its normative form. While the examples I draw on arise in the context of
reproductive technologies, l suggest that the analysis has broader implications for the recognition of broader
family forms and relationship.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Disputes about filiation' have not figured prominently in modem
family law. Changes over the past fifteen years, however, have compelled
both courts and legislators to discard their previous assumptions that
parental status is easily ascertained or that the rare disputes over parental
status disqualify filiation as a key concern. New medical and scientific
technologies have fragmented biological processes and have eroded the
familiar social arrangements that rely on this biological order. Assisted
reproductive technologies (ARTS) make possible the separation of the
genetic, gestational, and rearing aspects of motherhood, and the genetic
and rearing aspects of fatherhood, while DNA technology allows biological
paternity to be established with almost complete certainty. In the midst of
these technological changes, courts are called upon to resolve competing
claims of maternity and paternity arising from their use.
ARTS hold out a promise of alternative family forms. They invite a
reconception of filiation by opening a view on the relationship of law to the
social and biological construction of parenthood and, more significantly,
the asymmetric, gendered relationships between paternity and maternity in
family law. While ARTs offer the possibility of alternative family forms,
some are disturbed by the ruptures in social relations that have been
precipitated by ARTs. For those who wish to challenge the conventional
heterosexual procreative family, these ruptures and fragmentations should
be embraced 2 as they forcefully reveal the gaps and deficiencies of existing
IFiliation was traditionally defined as the relationship of a son to his father and omitted the
relationship of father and daughter. I extend the use of this term to include the legal determination
of any parent-child relationship
2 For a more extensive discussion of this point, see R. Mykitiuk, "Fragmenting the Body" (1994)
2 Austl. Feminist L.J. 63.
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taxonomies.3 They open up a space in which we can evaluate the limitations
of old conceptual paradigms of maternity and paternity and the
assumptions upon which we have ordered kinship relations. Recent case
law illustrates however, that North American courts have not embraced this
potential partly because they have been inhibited by the established legal
categories of filiation. Indeed, these cases forcefully reveal the ways in
which law resists revisioning the family by invoking the putative authority
of biology. This article xll demonstrate that the case law surrounding ARTs
provides away in which we can disentangle law and "natural facts" in order
to arrive at possible reconstructions of family lawv and kinship relations.
The initial part of this article provides theoretical grounding for the
analyses to follow by examining two separate, but related, concepts that
underpin legal determinations of filiation: kinship and the legal ideology of
the family. Next, the article discusses the historical legal treatment of
determinations of matemity and paternity and the assymetrical gendered
effects of the governance of filiation. The final section of the article
explores the challenge that ARTs pose to the normative concepts of
parenthood, maternity, paternity, and family inherent in family law through
a detailed analysis of several key cases (primarily, but not exclusively,
Canadian) involving ARTS. In this section, I demonstrate how law and
conventional legal reasoning obstruct the affirmation of new and varied
parent-child relations and expanded notions of kinship.
II. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS
A. Kinship As Social Construct
In making determinations of filiation, law is influenced by two
distinct, yet interrelated, forms of know-ledge. The first is the system of
kinship relations through which the social recognition of relatedness
between and among persons is articulated. The second, legal ideology,
draws upon normative constructions of family that govern the relationship
between parents and children. When making legal determinations of
filiation, law uses both bodies of knowledge to render pragmatic
determinations of who is aparent, who is a child, and w-ho is a parent of a
particular child. Privileged legal relationships are granted to those who are
3 See D.J. Haraway, Sinian , Cyborx. and Jonzmcn: The Rcirnentwn of Nature (London: Free
Association, 1991) and M.H. Shapiro,-Fragmenting and Reazembling the World; Of FlingSqwrrctb,
Augmented Persons, and Other Monsters" (1990) 51 Ohio St, LJ. 331,
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assumed to share an intimate biological relationship with a child based on
the understanding of the role biology plays in the creation of parenthood;
this role, of course, differs for men and women. Kinship, then, can be seen
to organize both natural or blood relations and more positive law or legal
relations.
As modem anthropology has recognized, kinship is the "social
construction of natural facts."4 Cultural ideas about procreation provide the
starting point for thinking about relatedness and the way in which the Euro-
American institutionalized system of kinship privileges both biology and
marriage when ordering and sanctioning relationships. Beliefs about
procreation are themselves foundational to a range of cultural definitions
concerning parenthood and kinship, gender and sexual difference,
inheritance and descent.' This particular cultural understanding articulates
relations of kin through procreation either by consanguinity (shared bodily
substance) or affinity (marriage). According to this system, because
procreation creates offspring from the body, this necessitates the inclusion
of social relations of intercourse and the biological relations occurring
throughout conception.6 When procreation is accorded prime significance
in this way, the circumstances of birth are believed to confer an identity
upon a child as a result of a "fact of life." 7 By presuming that biological ties
and the "facts of life" exist, we have created a strong rationale for
foundational arguments which favour the "naturalness" of family and
kinship relations! What has been construed within our understanding of
kinship as "natural," then, is a normatively essentialist position having
direct bearing upon the way we understand gender and sexuality within the
reproductive context. "Natural" procreation, in this sense, occurs only
between two heterosexual individuals, without the assistance of technology.
Kinship is everywhere a part of the social and cultural management
of reproduction and is intimately interlinked with "gender" as the survival
of any given society relies upon successful reproduction. Because gender
4 M. Strathern, Reproducing the Future: Essays onAnthropology, Kinship and the New Reproductive
Technologies (New York: Routledge, 1992) at 17 [hereinafter Reproducing].
5 S. Franklin, "Postmodern Procreation: A Cultural Account of Assisted Reproduction," in F.D.
Ginsberg & R. Rapp, eds., Conceiving the New World Order: The Global Politics of Reproduction
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995) 323 at 335.
6 1 Edwards et al, Technologies of Procreation: Kinship in the Age of Assisted Conception
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993) [hereinafter Technologies of Procreation].
7 1bid. at 14.
8 Ibid.
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not only encompasses biological categories of male and female, but also the
"ways in which these understandings are interwoven with other dimensions
of social and cultural life," a primary concern becomes how kinship affects
the sexual and reproductive roles of women and men and, in turn, genderO
Since kinship is also a fundamental source of social identitywithin
a culture, it is central both to understanding expressions of morality
embedded within social and legal ideas about relationships and perceiving
how morality assists in solidifying certain notions as "truths." As a result,
laws, norms and cultural ideologies use morality as one tool to define
where, when, and in what context reproduction and the resultant
relationships are sanctioned. When intercourse results in reproduction, and
the allocation of children becomes a societal objective, many more norms,
values and laws come into play. The various articulations of "marriage,"
"divorce," and "legitimacy" can illustrate how different human groups
handle reproduction.'0 Lastly, those practices understood to be either
unnatural or illegal are conceptualized as immoral within kinship's mode
of governance.
B. The Legal Ideology of the Family
Highlighting the complex socially constructed nature of kinship, and
the way understandings of it are incorporated into and built upon within
lawis pivotal to challenging determinations of filiation. Because one means
of establishing relatedness has its origins in biology and the natural facts of
life, kin relations have come to be seen as the natural processes in which
people become connected to one another through the transmission of
bodily materials. Conflating notions of biology, or relations of blood, with
that of "nature," results in a powerful foundational statement about how
reproduction occurs. Relationships derived from "blood ties" become a
means of establishing connections and disconnections between persons."
The relationship between the ideology of the family and the social
construction of kinship is dynamic with each discourse feeding off of one
another. It would be imprudent to grapple with issues of filiation within
9L Stone, imship and Gender An Introduction (Boulder, Colo.- Vcstwrcw Prc3, 1997) at 1.
10 lbid,
11S. Franklin & ML Strathern, "Kinship and the New Genetic Tcchnologie: An Aezment of
Edsting Anthropological Research" in Ethical Social and Le al1 spccts of MHman GcnomeAn ashs;
A Repor Complied forthe Commission qf European Communmes Mcdgcal Rsczrch Di tst n (DO-.X1j
Human Genome Anaysis Programme (January 1993) at para. 2.3.4.
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family law without engaging both discourses. Likewise, failing to recognize
distinctions between the two would disable any attempt to understand how
law's treatment of paternity and maternity has been created.1 2 The legal
discourse which privileges certain "familial" relationships over others is
constructed by its reliance on socially constructed understandings of kinship
and pervasive ideologies of the family.
The social recognition of parenthood bylaw is understood to follow
the biological fact of procreation.1 3 Once relations of kin are translated by
law into obligations, family formations take on additional social and
cultural signification. The legal ideology of family, which privileges
relations between adults and children based upon a married heterosexual
and procreative union, severely restricts who may be recognized as a legal
parent. 4 The law recognizes that blood can create legal ties, however, as a
result of the operation of social convention and morality, not all blood
relationships are given legal recognition. Law does not always mirror nature
and often it is more representative of the societal values (i.e., social and
cultural imperatives) it is employed to protect."5 In utilizing kinship ideals
to structure legal determinations, law acts as an informal kinship system.'
6
By conflating the relationship between natural and social facts and
construing them together as "natural," law reiterates and embeds these
social constructions within the way we order our relations. In this respect,
the family does not always reflect blood relationships, but can take on "a
classificatory role that is profoundly social."17
Despite dramatic changes in the past twenty-five years in the ways
people "choose to live and define themselves as family, and the possibility
12 See S. Boyd for a thorough discussion of the relationship between ideology and discourse.
"Some Postmodernist Challenges to Feminist Analyses of Law, Family and State: Ideology and
Discourse in Child Custody Law" (1991) 10 Can. J. Fam. L. 79.
13 Technologies of Procreation, supra note 6 at 22.
1 4 S.A.M. Gavigan, "A Parent(ly) Knot: Can Heather Have Two Mommies?" in U. Narayan &
JJ. Bartkowiak, eds., Having and Raising Children: Unconventional Families, Hard Choices, and the
Social Good (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999) 87 at 88.
15N. Rouland, "The Cultural Dimensions of Kinship" in J. Eekelaar & P. Sarcevic, eds.,
Parenthood in Modem Society (Boston: M. Nijhoff, 1993) at 6.
16 Franklin & Strathern, supra note 11 at para. 2.5.1.
17 Rouland, supra note 15 at 6.
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of disjoining genetic and social family ties,"1  only recently have these new
relationships gained legal recognition and protection. Recognition of more
diverse forms of family relationships and arrangements occurred first with
respect to non-marital heterosexual cohabitation and more recently in the
case of same-sex unions." The focus of these legal challenges has been the
legal interpretation of "spouse" so that the normative family has been
decentred primarily in the context of determinations of spouse and the
recognition of the relationship betveen the adult parties to a relationship.
This article challenges the filiative aspect of the normative legal
construction of the family: that is, that every child has t-wo--and only
two-parents of opposite sexes to whom the child is biologically related.
This norm is, as Harvison Young suggests, exclusive because for the most
part, the legal parental relationship is all or nothing and there is neither
room made for the recognition of quasi-parental or limited parental
relationships, nor questioning of the primary assumption that a child
usually does not have more than two parents. q Legal norms have shifted to
respond to changing social relations regarding the parent-child relationship
and the existence of the legal recognition of adoption, in loco parentis
status, and of parents of intention attest to this. These accommodations,
however, do not disrupt the normative ideal of the family to the extent
required by the consequences of ARTs.
In light of the development and use of ARTs, "facts of nature" are
even more readily subject to dispute. ARTs clinically require the separation
of intercourse from procreation, and reproductive activity from
heterosexual activity. Consequently, it is now increasingly possible to see
how the "naturalness" of heterosexuality, marriage and the nuclear family
is socially constructed and perpetuated. Presently, not all biological
relationships are activated as social ones. Paradoxically, there are also many
instances where law does not recognize that persons are related to one
another through ties of substance and physical bonding even where such
18 LL Shanley,"Lesbian Families: Dilemmas in Grounding Legal Recgnition of Parenthoad'
in.J.E. Hanigsberg & S. Ruddick, eds.,,ozhcrTroubkes: Rcah:in wgContempoarwVMarcmaIDknumns
(Boston: Beacon, 1999) 178 at 178. As Shanley and others argue, family arrangements do not often
conform to the normative ideal but involve a multiplicity of family forms and functiona-a prcml:e
which obviously underpins this paper.
19 Recent same-sex challenges to family legislation include: Canada 4A-G4. v. M.A,% [ 43]
1 S.C.R. 554; Egan v. Canaa [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513; Rosenkizg v. Canada (1993), 33 OR, (3d) 577
(C.A.); andM. v. H., (1999] 2 S.C.R. 3.
20 AIL. Young, "Reconceiving the Family: Challenging the Paradigm of the Ewxluss=i Famil,"
(1998) 6 Am. U.. Gender & L 505 at 506.
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ties are not instigated through procreation.2" Legal determinations of
parenthood in the context of ARTS are not simply
... discarding the old ... ideas about kinship but, on the contrary, are making every effort to
preserve the cultural notions of "real" biological parenthood. Toward this end, they are
reinterpreting NRTs and their tricky implications so as to reconcile them with these core
cultural notions of biological parenthood and the resulting ... family ideal."
The discrepancy between the recognition of social and biological
relations within law is, in part, a result of the way that maternity has been
constructed as both biological and unitary. For example, until recently
fatherhood was not the subject of biological scrutiny. The law created a
series of rules and presumptions attributing fatherhood on the basis of a
host of social factors and relationships. Legal determinations of maternity,
on the other hand, were historically unnecessary, it being assumed that the
act of giving birth necessarily resulted in motherhood. Since maternity has
traditionally been constructed purely as a biological "observation" and
since a child's relation to its mother was historically determined by the act
of birth, maternity was generally established on the basis of consanguinity.
This natural "fact" led to the theoretical and practical association of women
with the body within patriarchal systems of binary categorization. In law,
then, this gendering of reproduction has been translated into an asymmetry
between the social recognition of parenthood in the case of fatherhood and
the purely biological basis for the recognition of motherhood.
ARTs present the possibility of not only a legal mother and a
biological mother, but of the potential division between gestational and
biological (conception) motherhood thereby creating a third relationship
which was previously not possible. What was once considered natural and
evident has been thrown into disarray by reproductive technology with the
result that, in theory, motherhood is now as divisible a concept as
fatherhood has historically been.23
As a result of the relationships arising out of the use of ARTs, the
potential for restructuring our ideas of kinship and family, both in the
courts and in our minds, is easier to articulate. This technology, "makes
21 M. Strathern, "Displacing Knowledge: Technology and the Consequences for Kinship" in F.D.
Ginsburg & R. Rapp, eds., Conceiving the New World Order: The Global Politics of Reproduction 346
at 359 [hereinafter Displacing Knowledge].
22 Stone, supra note 9 at 273.
23 For a detailed discussion of surrogacy in the context of kinship see H. Ragone, Surrogate
Motherhood: Conception in the Heart (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994).
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visible the way two perspectives-biological and social-are connected to
each other in relations of kinship. The point becomes doubly evident when
new procedures introduce new procreative actors."  Law is caught up in
determinations based on biology and "natural fact." In terms of maternity,
it remains difficult to make legal arguments that challenge the unitary
nature of maternity, or favour the recognition of the social mother(s).
Arguments in favour of the recognition of social relationships in the context
of motherhood have not been successful because they do not fall within the
unquestioned rubric of kin relations, nor do they satisfy the category of
"mother" within the normative legal construct of the heterosexual, married,
procreative couple.2
III. FILIATION: HISTORICAL APPROACHES TO PATERNITY,
LEGITIMACY, AND MATERNITY
The belief that biological relatedness is the essence of the parent-
child relationship provides the justification for legal understandings of
filiation. However, the role biology plays in the creation of parental status
differs for men and women. As groundwork for the analysis of the potential
of ARTs to challenge legal constructions of the parent-child relationship,
the legal categories of paternity and maternity vll be examined in order to
illustrate the role played by biology within each, and to articulate how the
categories have developed in an asymmetrical manner when viewed from
the perspective of gender.
A. Paternity: Pater est quem nuptia demonstrant
The legal category of paternity provides the quintessential
illustration of the relationship between natural facts, social construction,
and legal ideology. The uncertainty of biological paternity combined with
the social, moral, and legal approbation of the traditional family (two
persons of the opposite sex reproducing), have created numerous means of
establishing legal paternity, as well as a variety of legal tests to determine
whether a man is the father of a child.
Prior to developments in genetic testing, the exact biological
relationship between a father and his child was impossible to verify and
24 Technologs of Procreation, supra note 6 at 14.
25D. Farquhar, The Other Machine: Discourse and Rcpreductive Tcchne!a,;ws (Nev. Yorh-
Routledge, 1996) at 35ff.
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legal presumptions of paternity historically "reflect[ed] a need to
compensate for the lack of certainty in the biological reality of paternity."26
At common law, the legal connection with the child's mother rather than
any direct biological connection with a child established paternity.
According to the still-existent maximpaterest quem nuptia demonstrant (or,
by marriage the father is demonstrated), if a woman was married at the
time she gave birth, her husband was presumed to be the father of the
child. No proof was necessary to establish the paternal relationship between
a married man and a child born within that union. Precisely because the
biological facts of paternity were unknowable, the legal presumption was
based on a social determination about a man's relationship with the mother
of a child thereby sanctioning the courts to assume a set of biological
facts.27
The common law presumption did not operate in cases where
evidence confirmed that the mother's husband could not have been the
biological progenitor of his wife's child.2 A man presumed to be the father
of a child could bring an action to disavow paternity for a child who was not
his genetic offspring. Historically, the evidence required to rebut the
presumption was proof of no intercourse beyond a reasonable doubt.29
Regardless of how difficult this possibility of disavowing paternity was in
fact, its import lies in the overt primacy of the biological tie for
determinations of paternity. Although the presumption could be disavowed
by the husband of the child's mother, it could not be rebutted by any other
man, even if he could prove he was the biological progenitor.3' Thus the
biological anchoring of legal paternity was more elusive and illusory-legal
truths were not always consistent with biological facts.
The historical presumption of paternity within a marital relation
was very difficult to overturn because of the vested interest society had in
"ensuring that a child was born into a family and would have the benefit of
26 T. Caulfield, "Paternity Testing in the Genetic Era" (1996) 17 Health L. Can. 19 at 21
[hereinafter "Paternity Testing"].
27 R. Mykitiuk & E. Sloss, "The Challenge of the New Reproductive Technologies to Family
Law" in Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, Legal and Ethical Issues in
Reproductive Technologies: Pregnancy and Parenthood (Ottawa: Supply & Services, 1993) 339 at 347.
2 8 Sir W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (New York: Wildly and Sons, 1967)
at 457.
29 j. Teichman, The Meaning of Illegitimacy (Cambridge, U.K.: Englehardt Books, 1978) at 5.
3 0 However, in several cases in the United States, the marital presumption was discarded when
a dark-skinned child was born to a white woman married to a white man. See D.E. Roberts, "The
Genetic Tie" (1995) 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 209 at 259ff.
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a legal mother and a legal father." 1 Paternity by presumption-aptly
referred to as "the legal fiction of biological fatherhood in
marriage" 2 -presenres normative claims about the nature of marriage and
family by codifying notions of the "naturalness" of sexual relations those
between husband and wife. Legal truths were not always consistent with
biological facts such that:
... what purports to be an inference about biological fact may actually grw " out of a
normative aspiration and may readily be transformed into a pr-ererptte c-mmand about
marriage and family, often without acknowledgment that such a tranformation haa taen
place. The important issue becomes not 'ho is, but v-ho should be having cei vath the
mother- her husband. Thus, the social construct, in fact normatve and mutable, drar;a
substantialbut disguisdlegitimay from the representation that it simplyc preav"g'r.e"
of nature.'
In both the context of paternity and maternity, the "idea of 'nature'
has 'come to mean biology'; therefore, the idea of relatedness has, to a
large extent, been 'biologized."' However, in order to construe the
existence of thepatemal biological tie, law has had to examine and attend
to the social relationships among men, women, and children.
Examining the category of "the bastard," we can see how the law
sought to uphold the norms of society against the facts of biology. The legal
construct of illegitimacy illustrates the tenuousness of the biogenetic tie in
determinations of paternity and the fact that paternity has always rested
upon a selective construction of biological facts. While the legal status of
illegitimacy has been eliminated in every Canadian province but Alberta,
the concept remains important for an understanding of the social
construction of paternity.
Historically, the law distinguished between legitimate, and
illegitimate children as an illegitimate child was one who was "not only
begotten, but born out of matrimony."3' ' In other words, the bastard was a
child resulting from unsanctioned sexual acts and was determined to be
filius nullius, or the child of no one. Biologically, the notion that a child is
31 Mykitiuk & Sloss, supra note 27 at 362.
32 S. Sevenhuijsen, "The Gendered Juridification of Parenthood" (1912) 1 Soec & L Stud 71 at
74.
33 M.M. Shultz, "Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthveod An Oppartunit for
Gender Neutralit' (1990) Wisconsin L Rev. 297 at 317.
3 4
"Paternity Testing," supra note 26 at 20.
3 5 Blackstone, supra note 28 at 454.
20011
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
the child of no one and has no kin relations is an obvious absurdity. Within
law, however, the illegitimate child literally had no legal relations and the
rights held by illegitimate children at common law were very few. The
biological links connecting a man to a child were all but irrelevant at
common law unless they were accompanied by the legal relationship of
marriage between that man and the child's mother.36 Because they did not
belong to a lineage, they could not be affixed with a legal surname,
although one could be attained by reputation or as a nickname. 37 An
illegitimate person could not establish future biological lineage and, as a
result of being "kin to nobody," had "no ancestors from whom any
inheritable blood could be derived., 3' Furthermore, illegitimate children
were not eligible to inherit from their parents.
Whether a child was granted legitimate or illegitimate status had a
direct bearing upon the rights and obligations attributed to a parent. The
objectives of the rules of marriage were to "ascertain and fix upon some
certain person to whom the care, the protection, the maintenance, and the
education of the children should belong."39 Therefore at common law, the
father of legitimate children had duties to maintain, protect and educate
their children.40 The duty of maintenance, however, was understood to arise
as a result of natural law, and was a direct result of the natural process of
reproduction. At common law the biological progenitor of illegitimate
children-even if only putative-had a duty of maintenance,
notwithstanding the fact that he was not the child's legal father. This
historical obligation has influenced the current legal conception of
paternity, and, more importantly, has become one of the accepted indicia
of paternity.
The common law presumption of paternity and the construct of
illegitimacy illustrate that paternity is social. Every aspect of the category
of illegitimacy speaks of the primacy of legally sanctioned social norms over
the alleged facts of biology and birth. Historically, law erased the body from
paternity. Biology was presumed from the social relationship. However
now, largely as a result of advances in DNA testing, the biological father
asserts itself. When the paternal body is produced, we should examine the
36 For a discussion of the status of illegitimacy in relation to maternity see below.
37 Teichman, supra note 29 at 36; and Blackstone, supra note 28 at 459.
38 Blackstone, supra note 28 at 459.
39 Ibid. at 455.
40 Ibid. at 446.
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sites very closely. For the first time in the history of human reproduction,
it is now possible to locate and "prove" biological fatherhood: that is, to
situate with certainty the biological father within his bodyl Recent
advances in genetic testing have offered fathers a double element of choice.
A man who is not married to the mother of his child can choose to
recognize that child as his own, while married men can choose to deny
paternity on the basis of genetic evidence.42 As a result, the concept of legal
paternity has become complex-it does not remain constant as the context
in which it is rendered varies.
An analysis of the statutory provisions that determine the
circumstances in which a man will be found a legal father, and of common
law decisions in which legal paternity has been ascribed, demonstrates the
complexity of the paternal relationship and of legal determinations of that
status. Under Canadian provincial legislation there are several
circumstances that result in a man being presumed to be the father of a
child. These include: if the man was married to the mother of the child at
the time of the birth of the child; if the man was married to the mother of
the child and the marriage was terminated within 300 days of the birth; if
the man married the mother of the child after the birth and acknowledged
that he was the father of the child; if the man was cohabiting with the
mother in a relationship of some permanence at the time of the birth of the
child, or the child was born within 300 days after the person and the other
ceased to cohabit; if the man has acknowledged paternity of the child and
is so registered under the Vital Statistics Act or similar legislation; and
finally, if the man has been found by a court of competent jurisdiction in
Canada to be the father of the child.43 In most jurisdictions, any interested
person may seek a judicial declaration of paternity." A man presumed to
be the father of a child may bring an action to disavow paternity. Where the
matter goes before the court, the birth registration (which may simply
41 C. Mossman, "DNA and the Stakes in Embodying Paternity" in L. Spaa. cd., Patcri, and
Fatherwcodl Myths and Realis (London: MacMillan Prc, 1993) 40.
42 The presumption of paternity is difficult to oxerturm. The onus re-ts on the man contezting
paternity to provide proof that he is, or is not, the father of the child. Biologial evidence obtained
through a blood test or genetic fingerprinting is usually the most comrlhng form of proof but the
court does not ahvays order blood tests. See T. Caulfield, "Canadian Family Law and the Genetic
Revolution: A Surey of Cases Invohing Paternity'Testing" tZU0) 46 Queen's LJ 67.
43For details of particular provincial schemes, see Sloss & Myhitiuk, siva note 27 at 352 and
n. 56.
44Ibid at 352 and n. 59.
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reflect a presumption of paternity) may be used, in most jurisdictions, as
prima facie proof of the facts recorded in it.45
Situations now arise where it is in the state's interest to emphasize
biological relatedness such as with the enforcement of maintenance
obligations.46 In particular, determinations of paternity are highly
contingent upon the social welfare policies of the state. As the importance
of marriage has declined, the state has taken an interest in the economic
well-being of children and sought to enforce paternal obligations of
financial support, regardless of whether a marriage ever existed.47 To
achieve this objective biological evidence is invoked in order to establish
legal paternity.
There have also been recent cases which appear to explicitly state
that the biological father is not the legal father of a child. Within adoption
legislation, consent to adoption is not required by the biological father of
a child in cases where he factually has neither a relationship with the child,
nor the mother of the child. 48 There have also been recent cases which
appear to de-emphasize the paramountcy of biology over social
connectedness. 9 In these contexts, the courts construe "parenthood" as an
issue of relationship, nurturance, shared experience, interdependency, and
responsibility rather than merely biology.
Another instance of the legal recognition of non-biological ties is
the doctrine of in loco parentis which has been developed in order to
recognize those who voluntarily provide support or assume custodial duties
for a child or children who are not legally his or hers.5 While the person
45 Ibid. at 352 and n. 63.
46 Paternity Testing, supra note 26 at 20.
47 The increasing emphasison this in Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom, masks
a concern with the burdening of the public purse in the guise of concern with the welfare of children.
For an analysis of this trend in the United States, see J.L. Dolgin, "Choice, Tradition, and the New
Genetics: The Fragmentation of the Ideology of Family" (2000) 32 Conn. L Rev. 523.
See e.g. the consent provisions and the meaning of the term "parent" in Ontario's Child and
Family Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.11, s. 137(1) [hereinafter CFSAI . For a detailed analysis of
consent provisions within adoption statutes, see Mykitiuk & Sloss, supra note 27 at 356-57. See also
S.(C.E.) v. Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto (1988), 64 O.R. (2d) 311 (Div. Ct.)
[hereinafter S. (C.E.)].
Paternity Testing, supra note 27 at 20. Caulfield makes this assertion in light of the following
cases: L.(T.D.) v. L.(L.R.) (1994), 114 D.L.R. (4th) 709 (Ont. Gen. Div.); and Zegota v. Zegota.
Rzegocinski (1995), 10 R.F.L. (4th) 384 (Ont. Gen. Div.).
50 Mykitiuk & Sloss, supra note 28 at 395. The Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985 (21D Supp,) c. 3, s.
2(2)(b) refers to this type of parental status as one who "stands in the place of a parent."
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standing in loco parentis is not accorded full parental rights and
responsibilities, he or she is legally recognized on the basis of the
relationship that has developed between her or him and the child.
Predominantly, this issue has received judicial consideration in the context
of the relationships between men and children upon the re-combination of
families. This is largely due to the high incidences of custody remaining
with the mother of a child or children upon divorce, the increasing
e.xdstence of single mothers, and the prevailing political and economic
conditions in which law acts as an arm of the state, and looks for private
sources of support. The bases for this type of relationship were articulated
in the 1999 Supreme Court of Canada case Chartierv. Chartier' Financial
support, emotional support, and the child's relationship with his or her
absent biological parent are taken into consideration. The Court also
examined the extent of the child's participation in the family unit, the level
of interaction between the parent and child in terms of discipline and child
responsibility to that parent, and the extent to which the child is
represented by the adult "to the child, the family, the world, either explicitly
or implicitly, that he or she is responsible as a parent to the child."-'
Notwithstanding examples of the legal means through which a man
may become a father, these results cannot be categorized as indicating a
particular judicial "trend" regarding determinations of paternity. Rather,
the courts use the legal standard or indicia of paternity necessary in the
circumstances of the case to reify the construction of family that law has
traditionally favoured. In cases where a nuclear family appears to exist, law
is willing to allow a man to be a father strictly on the basis of a social
relationship. In cases where paternity is contested by two (or more) men,
the law now often relies upon strict biological determinations in order to
maintain the appearance of only one legal father. In circumstances where
a child's biological father is knovn but neither supports nor cares for the
child, law is willing to recognize the limited social contribution of another
man or men. Within family law decisions regarding the father/child
relationship, the courts are and always have been willing to bestow paternal
status upon men on the basis of either biological or social relationships. As
a result, more and differently situated men are legally recognized as fathers,
51 [1999]1 S.C.R. 242 [hereinafter Charticr]. Although the principe useof the ductrinef mrano
parentis is meant for determinations of support obligations, the Court in Chanter discu z-d feQan of
the relevant factors to be taken into account wvhen asse :ing a parent-child relatonsihp,
52 b1i. at 261. Similar factors are considered in the conte't of "cttlcd mntentton" Although the
financial aspects of a settled intention parent-chld relationship are key constderationw, court5 al.o
often consider the social, emotional, and psychological factors in the relattonhip.
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or as having a significant relationship with a child deserving of legal
recognition.
B. Maternity: Mater est quam gestation demonstrat
Until recently, courts have rarely been burdened with disputes
about maternity. Women have been placed in a passive position in relation
to their parental status resulting from the presumed biological inevitability
of their reproductive role. Biology, including both genetics and the
processes of gestation and birth, was historically paramount and decisive in
the maternal context. This is reflected in the maxim mater est quam
gestation demonstrat (or "by gestation the mother is demonstrated"). The
notion that gestation is demonstrative of maternity has historically been
applied, without qualification, to all births. 3 Because birth can be
witnessed, the biological and social/legal aspects of maternity have been
construed as inextricably linked.
In order to articulate the constitutive elements of the legal
construction of maternity, the relationship between maternity and paternity
within a patriarchal society must be addressed. Maternity, as a legal
category, has been articulated in the contexts of heterosexual monogamous
marriage, and the system of patrilineal descent. Maternity in a patriarchal
society is what mothers and babies signify to men.54 "Patriarchal kinship is
the core of what is meant by patriarchy; the idea that paternity is the central
social relationship."55 In our society, the ideology of patriarchy provides us
with an understanding not only of the relations between women and men,
but also of the relations between women and their children.56 Mothers arise
out of the act of male impregnation and, although they play a biological
role, it is seen as secondary to the male contribution. In a patriarchal
system, when people talk about blood ties, they are referring to a genetic
tie or a connection by "seed." This particular form of male domination does
not attribute value to the maternal tie; rather, it focuses strictly on genetic
linkages.
53 M. Coleman, "Gestation, Intent, and the Seed: Defining Motherhood in the Era of Assisted
Human Reproduction" (1996) 17 Cardozo L. Rev. 497.
54 B.K. Rothman, "Motherhood Under Patriarchy," in Recreating Motherhood: Ideology and
Technology in a Patriarchal Society (New York & London: W.W. Norton, 1989) 29 at 29-30,
5 5 Ibid. at 29.
5 6 Ibid. at 29-37.
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Until women attained legal personalities, the definition of maternity
was relevant to the legal status of a child only to the extent that law
examined the relationship between the mother and father of a child. This
situation of legal insignificance resulted in ajurisprudential void concerning
the articulation of the ways in which a woman may legally become a
mother. The mater est presumption rendered determinations of parental
status problematic only in terms of a child's relation to her or his father, a
status which depended on whether the relationship between parent and
child came into being within the confines of legal marriage. Thus, at
common law and before modification by statute, a child born to a single
woman wasfilius nuIlius, the child of no one: " ... a bastard's mother, being
awoman, was in fact that veryno-one. In law, lineage, and in matters having
to do with property, a woman, until modem times, was a kind of nullity.""'
The mother of an illegitimate child had a customary, if not legal, obligation
to care for the child until which time she placed the child vth an authority
or the child was removed from her custody53
If awoman was married at the time she gave birth, her husband was
presumed to be the father of the child. This presumption is based on the
assumption that a woman's husband was the only person who would have
access to her reproductive capacities.
As a result, biological or genetic ties between parents and children
have been accorded great legal significance. Since the relationship of caring
and nurturing is not privileged within patriarchal conceptions of
reproduction, legal maternity has been strictly in opposition and
subordinate to paternity on the bases of both women's biological
contribution and their role as the gestators of the male seed. Further,
because of the primacy accorded to the male biological contribution, legal
maternity has taken on a secondary role, an essential component of which
is the social relationship of caring for children.
Adoption provides a good example of one circumstance in which a
child's legal mother is not the biological mother. However, the operation
of normative standards about heterosexual, monogamous marriage have
resulted in the virtual elimination of the contribution of the biological birth
mother in order to maintain the construct of the fertile nuclear family.' For
5 7 Teichman, supra note 29 at S3.
5S1id. at 41.
5 9 According to Drucilla Comell, "[ijt is only in the context of a sy:atem of duties that remain
bound upwith women's legal identity in the heteroseual family that we can eCen begin to understand
the unequal treatment of birth mothers and adopted children." See D. Cornell, "Retimaning
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the appearance of a nuclear family with biological children to exist, the
actual biological parents of the child must be removed from the life of the
child. To accomplish this, statutory provisions contain standard adoption
procedures in which the adoptive parents are substituted for the biological
parent(s).60 All of the rights and responsibilities of the biological parent(s)
are removed, and correspondingly attributed to the adoptive parents. This
approach to adoption operates essentially as one of assimilation rather than
one of acknowledged variation.6'
Before a child can be adopted, his or her legal parents or guardians
must give legal consent. The notion that every parent must consent
operates within statute to automatically include the child's mother, but only
to include the child's father depending on the factual nature of his
relationship with the mother.62 The requirement that a birth mother
relinquish all rights and status as mother upon adoption is an illustration of
the way in which the law perpetuates the woman/mother/motherhood
construct as an indivisible category and role. In the context of adoption,
legal determinations of the inability to act in accordance with societal
definitions of motherhood have resulted in the denial and reassignment of
legal maternal status. In addition, the types of behaviour acceptable for
mothers have been at issue in many legal disputes both in adoption cases,
and in other areas.63
Adoption and Family Law" in Hanigsberg & Ruddick, eds., supra note 18, 208 at 211.
60 Step-parent adoptions are an exception, as the biological connection to one of the child's
parents remains intact.
61 Shultz, supra note 33 at 320. As Shultz notes: "...intention, rather than biology, is the basis for
giving up or adopting a child, but an imagery of biology locked into conventional family forms has
shaped the transaction. Neither the surrendering biological parents nor adoptive legal parents have
had more than one choice about how to structure their relationship to each other or to the child." Ibid.
62 S. Fodden, Family Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 1999) at 97. For example, see the consent
provisions and the term "parent" in CFSA, supra note 53.
63 Cornell, supra note 59. See E.N. Glenn, "Social Constructions of Mothering: A Thematic
Overview" in E.N. Glenn, G, Chang & L. Forcey, eds., Mothering: Ideology, Eperience and Agenc'
(New York: Routledge, 1994) 1 at 13. According to Glenn, the conflation of woman with mother
appears an undifferentiated and unchanging monolith. This exists in sharp contrast to the historical
specificity, and variance of roles and contexts, in which men are linked to parenthood. The conflation
of "woman" and "mother" reflects a fusion of actor and activity and has historically been one in which
only women, or birth-mothers, are recognized as nurturers and caregivers. Further, Slaughter
illustrates how language is pivotal to this discussion. "Mother" is a term that refers to two functions:
childbearing and childrearing. Since women are usually both the primary childrearers and childbearers,
the two functions are usually collapsed under this term. However, there is nothing in nature that
requires women to "mother," nor that which prevents men from doing so too. See M.M. Slaughter,
"The Legal Construction of Mother" in M.A. Fineman & 1. Karpin, eds., Mothers in Law: Feminist
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The issue of step-parent adoption in the context of lesbian
partnerships is another example of a situation in which the traditional legal
construction of maternity has been expanded. In step-parent adoptions,
same-sex partners may now adopt the "natural" child of their partner."
Thus, two women may have a legal parental relationship with the same
child. While in fact, a child may now have two legal parents of the same sex,
the effect of a step-parent adoption continues to be the legal erasure of the
third parent. The result is the continued legal insistence upon the two-
parent family.
The common law understanding of maternity is supplemented by
two types of legislative provisions. The first is found within vital statistics
legislation, which commonly define "birth as the complete expulsion or
extraction of the fetus (or product of conception) from its 'mother."',0
Second, each province has provisions that allow "any interested party" to
seek a declaration that a person is or is not the mother of a child. The
provisions are seen as a potential avenue for challenging the assumption
that the woman who gives birth to a child is the child's legal mother. In
addition, women may apply for limited determinations of parental "rights"
Theory and the Legal Regulation of Mothedrood (New York : Columbia University Press) at 73
64 In Ontario, see K (Re) (1995), 23 O.R. (3d) 679 and Amendments becaue of the Supreme
Court of Canada decision in . v. H., S.O. 1999, c. 6. Same-soi partners n.w fall vathin the -zop.- of
persons who may apply to adopt a child under s. 146(4) of the Cldd and tam, Sercesrict, R.S.
1990, c. C.1 1., as am. by Consent and Capacity Statute Law- Anendicnt Act, S.O 1992, Q 32, s. 3;
RevisedStatutesConfinnation and CorrectionsAct 1993,S.O. 1993,c.27,Sch.;StatuteLa.'Amcnnent
Act (Goernment ManagementandSeivices), 1994, S.. 1994,c. 27,s.43(2);and.4drcsaq, Censsntar;d
SubstituteDecisionsStatuteLawAmendmentAct,1996,S.0.1996, .A,s.62 In Bntish Cohmbia, thoe:
who are permitted to apply to adopt a child are not restricted on the bazis of sewual orientation m
either applications made alone, jointly as a couple, or in the case of step-parent adoption Vherc one
applicant is the birth parent of the child. SeeAdopton.Act, RS.B.C. 1996, c. 5,-S-. 29(1), 2),
65 For statutory provisions, see Myldtiuk & Slos, supra note 27 at 423, n. 44.
66 bIM at 350. For statutory provisions, see Alberta'sDomestic RcUtwns Act, R.S.A. 199, Q D-
37, s. 64, which states that standing is limited to "a person claiming to be the father, mother or child
of another person"; Manitoba's Family Maintenance Act, R.S.M. 1937, e F-29, s 19-20;
Newf1oundland's Children's Law Act, R.S.N 1990, c. C-13, s. 6; New Brunsvaick's Chd and Famtly
ServicesAct, R.S.N.B. 1980, c. C-2.1, s. 100; the Northviest Temtories' Clutd WelfareAct, R.S.NXW.T
1988, c. C-6, s. 79; Ontario's Children's Law ReformAct. s. 4; Prince Edv. ard lland's ChddSfatus Act,
R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. C-6, s. 5; Saskatchewan's Children's Law,Act, SS. 1997, a. C,3 2, s. 43; Yukon's
Children'sAct, R.S.Y. 1986, c. 22, ss. 8-10, For a more dctailed analyzis of the Ontario provoison, sze
Fodden,supra note 69 at 71-72. In a recent Ontario case, a woman relied unsuccesfully uFzn such a
provision to apply for a declaration that she, in addition to her lesbian partner v.ho gave birth to the
child, was also the mother of that child. See also, Buist v. Grcaves, [1997] OJ No, 2646 (Gen, Div.)
[hereinafter Buist] discussed below.
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or have obligations imposed upon them by gender neutral statutes
pertaining to the responsibilities accorded to "parents."
C. Gender Neutrality, Asymmetry, and Legal Discourses of Filiation
The tendency now in modem family legislation is to refer to
"parents" rather than to mothers or fathers, maternity or paternity. One
might think such language is a positive reform. However, gender neutrality
treats parents as fungible and risks marginalizing the gendered aspects of
legal norms that continue to influence legal reasoning. Within the context
of filiation, the gender neutral language of parent must confront the fact
that biology is itself asymmetrical with respect to the contributions of males
and females to reproduction. But instead of acknowledging this difference
in ideology, legal categories of filiation reflect differences of power between
men and women, an asymmetry the legal categories of filiation transmit to
the present despite reform to the statutory language and practice of family
and marriage law.
The traditional uncertainty surrounding paternity and the
presumptive knowledge about the "natural" mother underpin legal filiation.
Historically, since paternity had to be constructed on a social relationship,
fathers represented culture while mothers were equated with nature
through the perceived biological certainty of maternity. Women are still
accorded legal maternal status only if they are able to fulfil both the
biological requirement and the normative behavioral requirements
established within law. Law's absolute alignment of maternity with "nature"
has rendered the construct both unitary and indivisible. Moreover, the
ability to choose to "recognize" offspring reflects asymmetrical power, as
choice is available only to men. While a man has the power to actively
recognize his offspring, a woman has no choice in the matter and is
passively assigned the status of motherhood through the "facts" of birth.67
While the concept of maternity fuses genetic, gestational, and
caregiving roles in a unitary construction of "natural" motherhood, the
failure to care for a child "denaturalizes"a woman and renders her "unfit"as
a mother. Whereas paternity is a construction allowing fatherhood to be
established in a variety of ways-including choice-maternity is a unitary
construction where women can be deprived of the status if both the
biological and social roles are not fulfilled. This naturalization of maternity
6 7 Reproducing, supra note 4.
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by law has precluded legal thinking about the distribution of maternity in a
manner similar to determinations of paternity. 3
IV. FILIATION REVISITED
ARTs have rendered obsolete the biological order constructing the
categories of filiation. "Nature" or biology cannot be held to be
determinative when it is deliberately manipulated, however, traditional
ideological constructions of maternity and paternity continue to inform
legal principles binding adults to children. The concept of biology, which
once provided a solid platform for determinations of parental status, has
been shaken by advances in ARTs. Paternity is nov determined, depending
on the context of the parental claim, either on the basis of biological or
social relatedness. With respect to maternity, the courts continued reliance
on notions of biological imperatives has led to unpredictable legal decision
making. Nor have provincial legislatures developed responses to issues,
such as surrogacy, that challenge a simple biological ideal of maternity.P
ARTs challenge the eisting limited legal convention of maternity.
They also challenge deeply held social norms:
It is precisely the shifting realignment of maternity as closer to paternity that social
conservatives all fear. When antiquated "natural" unified maternity confronts technoloy,-
the full range of maternal social relations can be reappropriated, rejected, or appreciated
as the diverse historical and social phenomena they are."
Maternity is now visibly divided into genetic/chromosomal,
uterine/gestational, and social/legal aspects.7t ARTs make it possible to
separate the genetic, gestational, and rearing aspects of motherhood (and
6S By using the term "similar" here, I do not mean to suggest that I favour a similarly situated
conception of formal equality. Quite the contrary. As one insightful external revicvcr of this article
noted, I want to argue that formal equality will get us nov.here becaue biology never has been and
never will be the exclusively relevant factor in determinations of filiation. First, becau-e biolog- has
always had a significant ideological component in legal discourse and cecond, because formal equality
assumes human relations can be reduced to a simplistic malelfemale d)adic equation. What ARTs do
is to clarify that the male/female dyad no longer has a purchase as a "biological truth" about
procreation and expose what has always been its ideological content. Thus, substantive equality in
determinations of filiation will require an analysis more reflective of complex social and material
relations and of the asymmetrical and diverse connections of multiple ers-ons to a particular child.
69 Art. 541 of the Quebec Civil Code renders surrogacy contracts void.
70 Farquhar, supra note 25 at 35.
71 The process of ovum enucleation through u'hich the nucleus of an ovm is replaced ith the
nucleus of another, expands the number of women who may be biologically related to a child.
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the genetic and rearing aspects of fatherhood), resulting in a child with
three women and two men with potential claims to the legal status of
parent. A woman can either provide the genetic material (i.e., a gamete or
ova) or carry the child or both. Furthermore, while it is true that the social
and biological aspects of maternity are split in some circumstances (like
gamete donations to a woman who intends to carry and raise the resulting
child), it is also sometimes the case that the social and biological categories
are blurred. This is especially true in the circumstances surrounding
surrogacy arrangements. A woman who commissions a surrogate may have
no genetic or bodily connection to the child produced, but views herself, in
part, as responsible for initiating the child's existence.7 2 Breaking down
maternity into three categories also highlights the conflation of the
activities of mothering and the status of being a mother. In the case of
social and/or legal mothering, it can be argued that both men and women
can nurture and rear infants so that, technically, either a man or woman
could be this type of "mother" to a child.
Conversely, it is now possible to impart biological certainty into
determinations of paternity,73 an area once fraught with uncertainty for
men. Genetic and reproductive technology has enabled scientific
verification of paternity at the very moment it forces us to reconsider
maternity. The separation of the genetic and rearing aspects of fatherhood
is, perhaps, less unique within law in so far as legal rules and presumptions
have, for a long time, ascribed paternity to men in relation to children to
whom they are not genetically connected. In recent paternity cases
involving custody and support, biological relations have been granted
priority.74 However, a line of jurisprudence also exists in which the courts
have not privileged biology over the best interests of a child."
72 See J.L Hill, "What Does it Mean to be a 'Parent'? The Claims of Biology as the Basis for
Parental Rights" (1991) 66 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 353; and J.A. Robertson, "Embryos, Families, and
Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New Reproduction" (1986) 59 S. Calif. L. Rev. 939.
73 Stone, supra note 9 at 80. Historically, paternity tests could only exclude individuals from a
group of potential fathers but could not determine which particular individual was the actual father.
DNA fingerprinting techniques have changed this situation and can now determine paternitywith a very
high degree of certainty-up to 99.99 per cent or better.
74 See S. v. M. (1994), 113 D.L.R. (4th) 443 (B.C.S.C.); D.- v. .W. [19921 O.J. No. 1737 (QL);
Saul v. Himmd (1994), 120 D.L.R. (4th) 432; S. (R.) v. H. (C.) (1989), 20 R.F.L. (3d) 456 (N.B.C.A.);
and D.(J.S.) v. V(W.L.) (1995), 11 R.F.L. (4th) 409.
75 See Zegota v. Zegota-Rzegocinski (1995), 10 R.F.L. (4th) 384 (Ont. Gen. Div.); L.(T.D.) v.
L.(I.R.) (1994), 114 D.L.R. (4th) 709 (Ont. Gen. Div.); and King v. Low, [198511 S.C.R. 87.
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The advent of ARTS places the asymmetry of filiation law in sharp
relief. Maternity is now indeterminate, while paternity appears certain.
More than one woman can now be biologically or "naturally" related to a
child and other women may provide a caregiving role. DNA testing can now
provide absolute certainty of the identity of the genetic father. But the new
indeterminacy of maternity comes about only in the unprecedented
circumstances of having to select one mother among contributors to the
heretofore fused indicia of maternity, while the certainty of DNA testing has
not eroded the social underpinnings of paternal status. In the cases
discussed below, courts have resisted defining paternity purely on a genetic
basis. In contrast, since the social relationships between women and
children were never accorded legal significance in the absence of biological
ties, legal claims to maternity on the basis of social ties are still silenced.
Norms have not developed to address the fragmentation of the female
biological contribution among several women. Conditioned by the fused
status of maternity, the legal process seeks to elevate a single claimant to
the status of mother. The result is the restriction of the legal category of
maternity to its historical content, and the virtual erasure of the claims to
maternity of differently situated women within the assisted reproductive
process. Evidence offered by nature is always selectively deployed in order
to fulfil ideological ends.
A. The Paternity Cases
The cases of Low v. Low 6 and Zegota v. Zegota-Rzegocinski"7
involve men whose wives were impregnated through anonymous donor
insemination with their consent and who later sought declarations of
paternity under the Ontario Children's LawRefomAct (CLRA)." Low is the
first case in Canada in which a declaration of paternity was sought in these
circumstances. After consenting to artificial insemination with donorsperm
and participating enthusiastically throughout his wife's pregnancy, Mr. Low
was certified as the child's father under the Viital StatisticsAct.: Upon the
breakdown of their marriage only days after the child was born, the Lows
sought a divorce. While they lived separately and apart since the birth of
76 (1994) 4 R.F.L 4th 103 (Ont. Ct. J.) [hereinafter Low I.
77 11995] O.. No. 204, online: QL (OJ) [hereinafter ZcSnaj.
78 R.S.O. 1990, Q C-12.
79 R.S.O. 1990, c. V4.
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the child, Mr. Low periodically visited the child, visits facilitated by several
orders granting access. At the time Mr. Low brought an application for a
declaration of paternity under the CLRA, he also sought an order for custody
or, in the alternative, access pursuant to the Divorce Act. Despite the fact
that Mrs. Low had agreed that Mr. Low stood "in the place of a parent"
under the Divorce Act,80 she argued that an order for custody or access
ought be denied. The trial court held that granting liberal access rights to
Mr. Low was in the best interest of the child.
Mrs. Low also contested the declaration of paternity. She argued
that artificial insemination with donor sperm rebuts the presumption of
paternity under the CLRA as Mr. Low is not the child's biological father.8
To support her claim, Mrs. Low relied on the language of section 1(1),2
which specifies that all persons are the children of their "natural parents,"
and section 8(1)(3), which extends the presumption of paternity to "a
person who marries the mother of the child after the birth of the child and
acknowledges that he is the natural father." These provisions suggest that
Mr. Low must have a biological tie to the child in order to fulfil the
statutory requirements of paternity. However, to clarify and interpret the
intended meaning of declarations of paternity in the wording of sections
4(1) and 5, the Ontario Court of Justice interpreted the provisions as
follows:
[Tjhewords "natural," "natural parent," "parent," "father," and "natural father," appearing
in these sections, are not defined in the legislation. In s. 1 (1), the word "natural" appears
before the word "parents." In s. 8(1)(3), the word "natural" appears before the word
"father." The omission of the word "natural" as an adjective in describing "father" in other
80 Divorce Act, supra note 50. Under s. 16, an application (i.e., an application for custody or
access in relation to a child of the marriage) can be made by either or both spouses or by any other
person. Pursuant to ibid, s. 2(2)(b), a "child of the marriage" includes "any child of whom one is the
parent and for whom the other stands in the place of a parent." Therefore, one can acquire quasi.
parental rights and obligations under the legislation without being the legal parent of a child.
81 CLRA, supra note 78. Pursuant to the CL&A, there are two means by which a declaration of
paternity can be granted. Section 4(l) permits "any mate person having an interest" to apply for a
declaration that he is "recognized in law" to be a father. Section 4(2) links the presumption of
paternity under s. 8 to the legal declaration of paternity in this section. Where the court finds that a
presumption of paternity exists under s. 8, and this presumption is not rebutted on the balance of
probabilities, a declaratory order of paternity pursuant to s. 4 in favour of the presumed father shall
be granted. A declaration of paternity can also be granted when a presumption of paternity does not
arise. Section 5 allows any male person to apply for a declaration that he is the father of a child. When
the court finds, on the balance of probabilities, that the "relationship between father and child" has
been established, the court can make a declaratory order of paternity.
82 Ibid. Section 1 establishes equal status for children by abolishing illegitimacy: children born
within and outside of marriage are considered the children of their "natural" parents
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sections suggests the intention of a meaning broader than mere "biological" father, in thovaQ
sections... the declaration authorized in s. 4(1) is not that a male person ts the "natural
father," rather that he is "recognized in law" to be the "father" of the child. This also
suggests an intention of a meaning broader than merely the "biological" father... Nowhere
in s. 5 is there any suggestion that the "relationship of father and child must have a
biological and genetic character... I conclude that this expression must mean something
broader than a mere biological relationshipP
The provisions of the CLRA were broadly construed in order to make the
paternal relation more than a "natural" or biological relationship with a
child.8
The court noted that while no Canadian jurisprudence exists that
establishes the husband of a woman inseminated with donor sperm is the
father of the child pursuant to section 5, a number of United States cases
have come to this conclusion. The court stated that a declaration of
paternity under section 5 would be issued. While, on the facts, the
presumption of paternity under sections 8(l)(1) and S(1)(5) was raised by
both Mr. Low's marriage to Mrs. Low at the time of birth, and the
certification of his paternity under the Vital Statistics Act, the court chose
not to consider whether or not the presumption of paternity is rebutted by
donor insemination. It would have had to consider this if it had followed a
subsection 4(2) analysis. But it avoided this consideration by making a
declaration of paternity pursuant to section 5.
In Zegota, the trial court also allowed the social, or intending,
father to assert paternal status through a declaration of paternity. Like
Low, the wife within a married couple conceived through artificial
inseminationwith donor sperm. The parties, however, separated before the
child was born and Ms. Wakeman -5 wanted to deny access to Mr. Zegota.
Mr. Zegota sought a declaration of paternity and asserted a claim for
access, while Ms. Wakeman sought a declaration that Mr. Zegota was not
the father of her child, Robin.
By virtue of the fact that he was not Robin's "natural or biological
father," Ms. Wakeman asserted that Mr. Zegota "[did] not qualify as a
'parent' at law." 6 The court not only declared that Robin was a child of the
marriage pursuant to the Divorce Act, but also that Mr. Zegota was father
83 Lowsupra note 76 at 113.
The court relied upon section 10 of the Intcrpretaton Act, R.S 0 1990. c. 1-11, vhich
authorizes the fair, large, and liberal interpretation of statutes for the public good.
wShe as also known by her former married name, Zegota.
:6 Zegota, supra note 75 at 3S3.
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of the child and should receive liberal access rights. Mr. Zegota's marriage
to Ms. Wakeman at the time of Robin's birth raised the presumption of
paternity under section 8(1)(1). However, the trial court declared Mr.
Zegota to be the father pursuant to section 5, which pertains to
circumstances where there is "no person recognized in law" to be the father
of a child. The court adopted the reasoning of Low without providing any
additional reasoning concerning how the relationship of father and child
had been established on the facts of this case, as required under section 5
or why a declaration under section 4(2) was not granted when indeed, a
presumption of paternity had been raised because the parties were legally
married at the time of the birth.
The assertion that artificial insemination rebuts the presumption
of paternity, made in bothLow and Zegota, has yet to receive direct judicial
comment. This is likely due to the desire of the courts in certain situations
to apply the presumption of paternity even in light of the biological
certainty of paternity. The courts appear reluctant to state unequivocally
that paternity can be determined on a purely biological or genetic basis
even though biological certainty in the realm of paternity can now be
established beyond question. In both Low and Zegota, although the
presumption of paternity was raised, rather than examining whether in fact
Messrs. Low and Zegota were the "fathers" of the children on the balance
of probabilities, the courts opted to forego the section 4(2) analysis in order
to engage directly with the section 5, declaratory provision. This may also
have occurred because of the absence of a biological "father" in the lives of
these particular children. These cases demonstrate that even in light of
technological developments in the area of reproduction, many situations
exist where it is desirable for the court to preserve the socially-based
paternal relations established within law. However, in order to keep these
provisions operative in cases where the courts do want to find the biological
father the legal father of the child, the courts have had to avoid ruling on
whether the presumption of paternity is rebutted in cases of donor
insemination.
Johnson-Steeves v. Lee87 illustrates court recognition of the
biological progenitor as the father of a child regardless of the existence of
an accompanying legally-recognized social relationship between the man,
87 [19971 A.J. No. 512, online: QL (AJ) [hereinafter Johnson.Steeves Trial]. The Alberta Court
of Appeal upheld the decision of the trial court, making only limited comment on the issues raised at
trial. See Johnson-Steeves v. Lee [19971 A.J. No. 1057 (Alta. C.A.), online: QL (AJ) [hereinafter
Johnson-Steeves CA.]. This case also raises an interesting contracts discussion around the nature of
legally binding paternity agreements which is outside the scope of this paper.
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woman and child"' Ms. Johuson-Steeves and Dr. Lee had a longstanding,
platonic friendship before they agreed to conceive a child through sexual
intercourse. Ms. Johnson-Steeves intended the arrangement to be
analogous to that of a donor insemination where she maintained custody
and primary decision-maling powers; both parties understood that Dr. Lee
would provide financially for the child and not be the primary decision-
maker. After the birth of Nigel, disagreement arose aboutwhether Dr. Lee
should have access as he desired. Ms. Johnson-Steeves sought an order of
permanent custody, an order that Dr. Lee be denied access to Nigel, and
an order for child support pursuant to Alberta's Domestic Relations Act
(DRA). 9 Under section 56(1) of the DR4, a mother or father may apply to
the court for an order for a right of access. The court may make, "any order
it sees fit" regarding the custody of a child and the right of access of either
parent. Dr. Lee contested the no access claim on the grounds that itwas not
in Nigel's best interest.
To determine whether Dr. Lee had the right to assert a claim for
access to Nigel, the trial court turned first to the definition of "father" in
the Parentage and Maintenance Act (P4)' and found Lee was the
biological father of the child as defined under section 1(g). After
determining that Dr. Lee was indeed the "father" for the purpose of
maintenance, the court then held that he may apply for a right of access
pursuant to the DR4. 9' In so doing, Dr. Lee was also recognized by the court
as Nigel's "parent." This distinction seems to arise from the interpretation
of section 56(1) (a) of the DRA which refers to the mother and father of the
child as well as its "parents." The court characterizes Dr. Lee's relationship
in response to Ms. Johnson-Steeves argument that it is essential to maintain
the difference between biological and social fathers9 " Biological fathers, in
ss Legally recognized relationships are marriage or cohabitation vithin a relationship of tome
permanence."
S9 R.S.A. 2000, 
. D-14.
90 R.S.A. 2000, c. P-1.
91 Surprisingly, the trial court judgment did not discucs or analyze the relevant provitone of the
DRA as applied to the facts of this case. The court of appeal only clarified this omt-ion to the exent
that it located the decision as resting upon Part 9 of the m1, supra note G9, entitled "'Establihing
Parentage," which sets out the circumstances in vhich declarations of parentage can be made. It 1s
uncertain, however, whether the court actually declares Dr. Lee to be Nigel's legal father pursuant to
what was then s. 64(1) (now s. 79(1)). Since the issue at hand was ace_:3, and not a determination of
full legal paternity, both courts appear to have skirted the isue.
92 The court of appeal declined to consider whether such a distinction should be adopted in
Alberta. Johnson.Steeves CA., supra note S7 at para. 20.
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her view, do not act as a "parent" to the child and should therefore not
have an entitlement to access:" ... where there is not a relationship between
the parties and no intended relationship between the parties then it is not
in the child's best interest to create a social father from a biological
father." 3
Using the doctrine of equitable estoppel, Ms. Johnson-Steeves
argued Dr. Lee's access rights should not be recognized because he had no
social relationship with Nigel. Both courts held Dr. Lee was not estopped
from seeing the child. Rather, both courts found it was Ms. Johnson-
Steeves' active and express denial of his constant requests to visit Nigel that
resulted in the tenuous relationship. The court of appeal acknowledged the
most glaring inconsistency with the simple sperm donation argument was
Dr. Lee's agreement to financially support the child and found it was
"incomprehensible" that anyone would want to financially support a child
without intending to develop a relationship.9 4
Ms. Johnson-Steeves, on the other hand, sought to deny access to
Nigel on the basis of her belief that, if the courts were to confer a right of
access upon Dr. Lee, her chosen "family" form would be threatened. The
notion that a woman should be able to choose to have a child who does not
have, in law, a father is entirely valid for this author but the court was of the
view that "society and biology have not yet reached the point where we
have dispensed with fathers or mothers completely. They form an integral
part of each child's life whether or not they reside with their children." 95 It
would seem that in situations characterized by the absence of a man who
has developed a socially based paternal relationship with a child, when the
courts are able to identify a biological father they are most likely to do so.
It is also obvious that the court did not want to change the "nature" or
structure of the legal family or recognize its continuing social
transformation. However, the existence of familial relationships between
lesbian or gay partners and their children, those of single parent families,
and families created through the use of ARTs provide ample evidence to the
contrary.
The claim by Ms. Johnson-Steeves that she had created a family
without a legal father was problematic on the facts of her case because Dr.
Lee did not seek legal recognition as the child's father, but only the limited
parental right of access. The fact that the courts recognized Dr. Lee as
93 Johnson-Steeves Trial, supra note 87 at para. 48 (emphasis added).
94 Johnson-Steeves C.A.., supra note 87 at para. 16.
95 Johnson-Steeves Trial, supra note 87 at para. 53.
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Rigel's "father" as a result of the operation of the statutes involved in the
claims regarding access, in combination with Ms. Johnson-Steeves' desire
to have a maintenance obligation affixed upon the man she considered to
be "a sperm donor," resulted in a decision that awarded access on the basis
of a finding of legal paternity, a standard not required for the
determination of limited parental rights or responsibilities."' When
determinations of legal paternity are not at issue, the relationship between
the man's responsibility of providing maintenance for a child, and the issue
of whether he should then be afforded access on that basis, is not
complicated. Financial maintenance for a child by a man should not
automatically vest in him a right of access, contrary to the court of appeal
in Johnson-Steeves?7 Both the man's relations with the child, and the
mother need to be assessed by the courts because men often use the right
of access to assail a functioning, non-traditional family.
Johnson-Steeves wil likely serve to continue to limit the ability of
women to create families without legal fathers. Women who try to create
"fatherless families" are faced with inconsistent legal results depending on
whether the source of the sperm used for conception is Imowna. In cases of
known donors, law operates to thwart attempts by women to create non-
traditional families in circumstances even where the parties have agreed
that the man vAll not play a role in the child's life. The current construction
of family legislation, and the interpretive approach used by the courts
always leaves open the possibility of finding fathers, or at least conferring
parental rights and responsibilities on a male figure. Women, in the case of
anonymous donation, can opt to have a fatherless family precisely because
the man has expressly chosen not to be recognized as the father. Moreover,
single and lesbian women are often denied access to anonymous donor
sperm, resulting in certain rights being accorded to a known donor whether
these women want this or not.
96 See Goudie v. Goudie, [1993] B.CJ. No. 1049. See also,Kepingv. Pacey, [1996) OJ. No 2274
(C.A.). Both cases demonstrate that a biological tie is not required for a man to acquire certain
parental rights to, and responsibilitiesfor a child such as maintenance and acces, In these caezts actual
patemitywas not at issue, rather the courts had to determine v'hether the men had asufficient czaal
relationship with the children to establish legal rights and duties.
This assertion has to be made in light of the understanding that the financial suppart
obligations for children do not establish the type of relattonship that should fall upon indiidual men
in the absence of a relationship -ith the child; thisshould be a responsibihty of the state. Where a man
is compelled to pay maintenance, in order for him to aszert a right of acesa (or another parental
right), he must haxe a social relationship with the child. Thisview conforrmsvwth the ruling inS.(CE;),
supra note 48, and several American cases. See e.g. Ldr v'. Robertson, 463 U.S. 243 (1933); and Matter
of Robert 0. v. Russell KJ, 604 N.E. 2d 99 (N.Y. 1992).
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Low, Zegota, and Johnson-Steeves illustrate the various ways a man
may legally become a father while presenting maternity as absolute and
verifiable. Statutes, presumptions of paternity and declarations of paternity
all incorporate notions of social and biological relatedness and appear to
be flexible in their application of standards depending on the operative
relationships within a particular case. At present, statutes preclude the
creation of alternative family forms, and alternative versions of relatedness
by preserving men's choice whether or not they desire legal recognition.
Law needs to better account for the motivations of the parties to the
conception of a child in order to determine the significance of the
relationships created.
B. The Maternity Cases
In Buist v. Greaves,9s the lesbian co-mother of a child asked the
court for a declaration under section 4 of the Children's Law Reform Act
(CLRA) that she was a mother of a child conceived by artificial insemination
and gestated by her former partner. Buist also asked the court to grant an
order for sole or joint custody of the child and an order that he not be
removed from Ontario by his biological co-mother who sought to relocate
to British Columbia. Ms. Buist was not asking the court to recognize her as
Simon's sole mother. Instead, she asked the court to recognize that Simon
had two legal mothers based on her active and involved caring for Simon.
To support this position, Buist pointed to the "precedent for a child
having two mothers in the case of same-sex adoption."" In refusing to
declare Ms. Buist a co-mother, the Ontario Court of Justice stated that the
language of section 4, and specifically the use of the definite article "the"
before "mother," indicates that the drafters of the legislation intended that
98 Buist v. Greaves [19971 O.J. No. 2646 (Gen Div.), online: QL (OJ)[hereinafter Buist].
99Ibid. at para. 34. For a discussion of the legal recognition of same sex step-parcnt adoption see
below. Note the court does not explicitly state that the children in question in Re K have two legally
recognized mothers. Whether intentionally or not, they state only that the definition of spouse in the
Human Rights Code, which is incorporated into the Child and Family Services Act, violates s. 15(1) of
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms by denying to gay or lesbian people the right to apply for adoption
as a couple. The legal concept under dispute in the step-parent cases and legislation is that of spouse,
not maternity, paternity or filiation. Technically, there is no jurisprudence which states that a child has
two legal mothers. Of course, the effect of an adoption order (including an adoption order in the
context of a step-parent adoption) is to confer all of the rights and responsibilities of legal parenthood
on the individual adopting the child(ren), and the birth of certificate of the child is altered to reflect
this but courts and legislatures have avoided express alternation of the underlying basis of the
construction of maternity and filiation.
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only one person could be the mother of a child. Moreover, even if it was
possible for the courts to make such a declaration, Ms. Buist had not
satisfied the court on a balance of probabilities that the relationship of
mother and child has been established as required by section 4 (3 ).'" To
make this conclusion, Justice Benotto was particularly persuaded by what
he referred to as "Simon's perspective": the fact that Simon called Ms.
Greaves "mama" but called Ms. Buist "gaga," which is short for Peggy, and
that when he was with Ms. Buist for extended periods of time without Ms.
Greaves, he became distraught. Of additional significance to the court was
the finding that Ms. Buist did not refer to Simon as her son until after the
separation of the parties and that during the relationship when Simon was
sixteen months old, Ms. Buist, a lawyer, drafted and commissioned a
Statutory Declaration sworn by Ms. Greaves which included the following
sentence: "There is no other parent of [Simon] who is known to me orwho
has any legal claim for parental rights including custody." The court held
that while the relationship between Simon and Ms. Buist was very close,
Simon considered Ms. Greaves his mother."t 1 Moreover, even if the court
had the jurisdiction to declare that a child could have two mothers under
section 4, it would not have exercised its discretion to do so in these
circumstances.
The case of co-mothering in Buist highlights the court's inability to
e.tend legal motherhood to more than one woman, and, in comparison
with the paternity cases discussed earlier, demonstrates the limited way(s)
in which a woman may acquire parental status. If Ms. Buist had been a
man, she would have been favourably situated to claim legal status as a co-
parent, and the legal avenues available to her in which to do this would
have been much greater.
In the United States, the courts have considered legal
determinations of maternity in a greater number of cases. Johnson v.
Calvert t z involved gestational surrogacy and the claim for legal parenthood
00 Ibd at para. 35. This provision states that i[where the court finds on the balance of
probabilities that the relationship of mother and child has been established, the court may make a
declaratory order to that effect." Section 4(2) provides that ' [wvhere the courtfinds that a presumption
of paternity edsts under section S and unless it is established, on the balance of probabilitie. that the
presumed father is not the father of the child, the court shall make a declaratoryorder confirmingthat
the paternity is recognized in law."
o Ibid.
102 Johnsonv Cahert, 19 Cal Rptr. 2d. 494 (Sup. Ct.) [hereinafterklhnsanSup Ct.]; and Jahnsi
v. Calvert, 296 Cal. Rptr. 369 (C.A.) [hereinafterklolnn C.J.1. For anotherzew on this oc'e, ee JL
Dolgin, supra, note 47 at 637.
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status of the surrogate mother against the non-biological, or intending
mother, and the father of the child. Anna Johnson was a woman of African
American, Aboriginal and Irish heritage. She worked as a vocational nurse
at the same hospital as Crispina Calvert, a registered nurse of Filipino
heritage. Johnson contracted to gestate and give birth to an embryo formed
by the sperm of Mark Calvert, who is white, and the ovum of his wife
Crispina. There was a falling out during the course of the pregnancy and
both parties filed suit approximately one month before the child was born,
each seeking a declaration of legal parenthood in their favour. Johnson
based her claim to maternity on the fact that she gave birth to the child.
The Calverts claimed that Crispina's genetic relationship to the child
established that she was the mother. In California, a child can have only
one "natural" mother under law.
The case illuminates two key concerns. The first is that restrictive
legal definitions of "mother" can intensify oppression for women who are
poor and who face racial discrimination. The second is the alacrity with
which the courts relied on genetic evidence to establish filiation in this case.
In a social climate where genetic explanations of individual characteristics
and behaviour are given increasing prominence, courts may tend to rely on
genetic evidence to establish filiation.
The trial court ruled in favour of the Calverts, finding that they
were the natural parents of the child irrespective of the gestational role
played by Johnson because they had provided both the ovum and the
sperm. 3 Despite recognizing the novelty of the circumstances, the
California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court decision. The decision
was based upon the results of blood tests which, predictably, showed no
genetic link between Johnson and the child. On this basis, the court held
that Johnson could not be the "natural" mother of the child. For the first
time, however, the court acknowledged that two women had legitimate
claims to motherhood based on biological links to the child. 1°4
The appeal court resolved Johnson's claim to maternity on the basis
of section 895 of the Evidence Code which directs courts to determine
paternity on the basis of credible expert evidence and verified blood tests.
The court concluded that:
103Anna J. v. Mark C. No. X-633190, slip op. (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 1990).
104 In other cases in which the custody of children was contested in the context of a surrogacy
arrangement, the principle that the woman who gives birth is the natural mother of the child was not
questioned. See e.g. Matter of Baby M.,537 A.2d 1227 (1988); and Adoption of Matthew B.-M.,232 Cal.
App. 3d 1239 (1991).
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We must "resolve" the question of Anna's claim to maternity as wc would rcoQVe the
question of a man's claim to (or liability for) paternity when blood tests positiv-ly exclude
him as a candidate .- section S95 determines uho is the "naraF' mother of the child. WC
must conclude it is not Anna.'5
Relying upon gender neutrality provided for in the Unifomt Parentage Act
(UPA),1t 6 the court applied the same standards used to determine the
natural father to determine the natural mother. In so doing, it refuted
Johnson's claim that she was the "natural" mother on the basis of blood test
evidence.
As has been noted in many other contexts, often the greatest
inequalities result from treating unlike situations in a like manner. Even
vith the advent of ARTs, the biological contribution of men is limited to the
provision of genetic material. However, a woman's biological contribution
embraces both the provision of genetic material and gestation. Johnson
argued that she was the child's mother as a result of gestation and giving
birth. The court, however, erased her bodily contribution to the creation of
the child by relying on section 7003 of the uPA't 7 and, digging in its heels,
concluded that "with the exception of this and the relatively few other
'gestational' surrogacy cases, the 'natural mother' is always the person who
gives birth to the child. The statute does not say that the woman who gives
birth to the child is the natural mother." W3
The court refused to interpret this section to say that the woman
who gives birth to a child is automatically the natural mother, preferring to
hold that it only offers a woman whose maternity was disputed one way to
establish a parent-child relationship.1  Surprisingly, the court went on to
recognize that, "[t]he fact that another person is, literally, developed from
a part of oneself can furnish the basis for a profound psychological
105 Johnson, CA.,supra note 102 at 376 [emphasis addedi.
106 Cal Cir. Code, Part 7, Division 4, (§§ 7000-7021), online: WL (CA CIVIL). The cUit bases
parent and child rights on the existence of a parent and child relationship rather than on the marital
status of the parents." See Johnson C.4., supra note 102 at 374, n. 14. According to § 7015: "any
interested party may bring an action to determine the existence or nonexistence of a mother and child
relationship. Insofar as practicable, the provisions of this part applicable to the father and child
relationship apply."
107 1WL, § 7003 suggests that "[between a child and the natural mother it may be established by
proof of her giving birth to the child, or under this part." (emphasis added)
108 Johnson C.A.,supra note 102 at 377.
109 IbMd at 377.
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bond."1 0 This insight, however, was used to uphold the importance of
genetics-not gestation-as a powerful factor in the creation of human
relationships.
The court also devalued opinions which supported the position that
genetics alone should not be the exclusive factor in determining parental
rights."' Instead, they remarked on the uniqueness and importance of the
genetic contribution, rendering the contribution of the surrogate literally
without value. It appears, on this reasoning, that "any womb" will do.
The majority of the supreme court of California affirmed the
decision of the court of appeal."' However, the supreme court disagreed
with the court of appeal's reading of section 7003(1) of the Civil Code. It
did not interpret the statute as requiring a woman to first demonstrate
through blood test evidence that she is the "natural" mother of a child
before her evidence of having given birth can establish that she is the child's
natural mother."3 The court held that it is not true that only a "natural"
mother can attempt to establish a mother and child relationship by having
given birth. Both giving birth and genetic connection as means of
establishing a mother-child relationship, were found to exist as alternative
methods of proof under the statute. On the issue of who the "natural"
mother is according to the UPA, the California Supreme Court held:
[I1n our view, the term "natural" as used in subdivision (1) of Civil Code section 7003 simply
refers to a mother who is not an adoptive mother. Section 7003 does not purport to answer
the question before us, i.e., who is to be deemed the natural mother when the biological
functions essential to bringing a child into the world have been allocated between two
women.
1 4
110 Ibid. at 380-81.
III The amicus curiae brief from the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Southern
California argued that the "fundamental rights of intimate association and procreative choice ..
exercised by all of the parties" require that genetics alone not be the "exclusive factor in determining
parental rights." Ibid. at 378. As well, the court brusquely dismissed the opinion of the Committee on
Ethics of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists who argued that "the genetic link
between the commissioning parent(s) and the resulting infant, while important, [are] less weighty than
the link between surrogate mother and fetus ... ." Statutory interpretation, according to the court, did
not encompass "what a group of doctors, however distinguished and learned in their field, think the
law ought to be." Ibid
112 Johnson, Sup. Ct., supra note 102.
113 Ibid at 499.
114 Ibid. (emphasis added).
[VOL. 39, NO. 4
Beyond Conception
Each woman had presented acceptable proof of maternity, the court
reasoned, and it then inquired into the intention of each in order to resolve
the dispute.1 5 The court found that but for the intention of the Calverts to
have a child who was genetically related to each of them, the child would
not emist and the situation was therefore not one in which the Calverts
donated a zygote to Johnson.116 Although Johnson agreed to gestate the
child, the court found that it was the parties intention to bring the child into
the world for Mark and Crispina, and that Crispina intended to be, and was,
the child's natural mother. Thus, on the matter of the splitting of the
functions of maternity betveen two women, the supreme court argued that:
... although the Act recognizes both genetic consanguinity and giving birth as a means of
establishing a mother and child relationship, %,hen the two means do not coincide , thin
one woman, she xwho intended to procreate the child--that is. she %,he intended to bnrng
about the birth of the child that she intended to raie as her din-s the natural nivcr
under California law."'
Declining to change the zero-sum results brought about by law, the
supreme court concluded that:
[Alnyparental rights Anna might successfully assert could come onlyat Cri-pina5exp.nze.
Aswe have seen, Anna has no parental rights... and she fails to F.rsuade us that sufficiently
strong policy reasons exist to accord her a protected liberty intere.-t v hen such an interest
would necessarily detract from or impair the parental bond enjo.cd by Mark and
Crispina. m
In Re Marriage of Moschetta'" involved a traditional surrogacy
arrangement where the courts had to determine which woman-the
"intending mother" or the surrogate-should be found the child's legal
mother. In this case, the surrogatewas factually understood to be the child's
"natural" mother. The matter to be determined, however, was whether in
the absence of a formal consent to adoption by the surrogate, the surrogacy
115 Justice Kennard, in dissent, presented an excellent critique of an "intent-based" test and
argued instead for a -best-interests' test for these kinds of cases. See i.L at 50-519. One of the
perverse results of the intention rule would be that in situations. ecre the intended mother ivthdra-o, "
her intention to have or raise the child, the gestational mother might be viceved as a legal straner to
that child who would then be left without a legally recognizcd mother.
1 16 Iba- at 500.
1 1 7 1bid. (emphasis added).
Hs8 Ibid at 504.
119 25 Cal. App. 4th 121S [hereinafterMoscitta].
2001]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
agreement between the parties could be enforced by the court which would
effectively deprive the surrogate of her legal parental tie to the child.
In 1989, Elvira Jordan was artificially inseminated with the sperm
of Robert Moschetta. Robert and Cynthia Moschetta, a married couple,
desired a surrogacy arrangement because of Cynthia's infertility as well as
their desire to have a "biologically related" child. In exchange for $10,000,
Jordan promised to assist the Moschettas in adopting the child and give
them sole custody.' 20 During Jordan's pregnancy, however, the Moschettas
experienced marital problems, a situation Jordan only learned of when she
began labour. After the birth of the child, Marissa, Jordan initially refused
Robert access to the child for two days while she reconsidered the
surrogacy agreement but, upon the Moschettas' promise to remain
together, Jordan allowed them to take the child home. Within seven
months, Robert left the family residence with Marissa.
At trial, all parties agreed as to the unenforceability of the
surrogacy contract. The trial court held that Robert Moschetta and Elvira
Jordan were Marissa's legal parents and granted them joint legal and
physical custody on that basis. On appeal, Robert challenged the
determination of Jordan's legal parental status by alleging an abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court and by contending that the
surrogacy contract should, in fact, be enforced. He argued, on the basis of
the Unifonn Parentage Act (UPA), that Cynthia Moschetta was the legal
mother of the child.
In Moschetta, since both the gestational and the biological aspects
of maternity were located within the same woman, the trial court held that
parentage was easily resolved in favour of Jordan under the terms of the
UPA. The court, followingJohnson, looked to the presumption of paternity
embedded in the UPA as extended to the mother: "insofar as practicable,
provisions applicable to the father and child relationship apply in an action
to determine the existence or nonexistence of a mother and child
relationship."' Whereas in Johnson, both women could demonstrate a
"natural" connection to the child and therefore no examination of
presumptions was necessary, in Moschetta, the maternal claim made on
behalf of Cynthia Moschetta was novel as it was based upon the existence
of a purely social relationship.
Moschetta argued that although Cynthia and Elvira were equally
the mother of Marissa, Cynthia actually intended to be the child's mother
120 Ibid. at 1223.
121 Johnson, Sup Ct., supra note 102 at 498.
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and, according to the Supreme Court of California in Johnson, should be
found so. But, according to the California Court of Appeal, Cynthia was not
equally situated to Elvira because she was not biologically related to the
child and was therefore not the mother "at all."-. Relying next on section
7541 of the UPA, 1 3 Moschetta attempted to interpret the presumption as
gender-neutral so that "husband" and "wife" could be interchanged with
the result that the child of a husband cohabiting with his wife should be
presumed a child of the marriage. The court rejected this interpretation
because it was not absolutely conclusive and could be defeated by blood
tests showing that the husband is not the genetic father of the child.'2 The
trial court had, on its own motion, ordered blood tests establishing Elvira
Jordan as Marissa's genetic mother which, in combination with the
undisputed fact of Cynthia's infertility, led the court of appeal to conclude,
"genetic parenthood established byblood tests trumps apresumption based
on the cohabitation of a married couple."'12
Robert also argued on the basis of section 7611(d) that Cynthia
should be presumed the child's natural mother because she held the child
out as her own. 6 The court of appeal found the argument wholly
"unpersuasive." Cynthia's infertility entailed that she could never hold
Marissa out as her "natural" child given the absence of biological, natural
and genetic connections. 27 Moreover, the court held that a more
fundamental reason the argument did not succeed was the statutory
presumption of paternity does not "reasonably apply" to surrogacy cases
because:
122 Moschetta, supra note 119 at 1224.
12 CaL Faro. Code § 7540, online: WL (CA FAM). The pro'ision statcs that "the child of a
wife cohabiting with her husband,who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusiely presumed to be a child
of the marriage."
124 Moschetta,supra note 119 at 1222-26. The court aho read in the exception to the presumption
contained within 12 CaL Fai. Code § 7541, online: WL(CA FAM) concerning the primacy of bload-
test evidence in defeating a finding of paternity.
1
25Moschetta, ibid at 1225. It is essential to note that the courts do not ala5 order blood tets,
especially in light of the existence of a marriageor marriage.hKe relationship betv.een the partit:e.sho
hold themselves out to be the parents of a child.
12612 CaL Fam. Code § 7611(d), online: WV. (CA FAM) states that "a man is ahO presumed to
be the natural father of a child if he 'receives the child into his home and olr.nly hold. out the child
as his natural child."'
1
2
7 Moschetta, supra note 119 at 1226. In this brief, disturbing and clo:e to tragic concluon, the
court failed to understand the nature of the presumption vhich is that it is not es~ential that the parent
actually have a biological or genetic tie to the child; rather, the question is v, hether that parent has
behaved in such a manner as to recognize the child as his or her own.
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of the absence of doubt as to the identity of the natural mother. There is no question of
biological parenthood to settle. Unlike the context of illegitimacy from which the
presumption arose, in surrogacy there is no need to resort to presumptions. All parties
know who gave birth and who is genetically related to whom.
The court interpreted the presumption in light of the history and legal
status of legitimacy where legitimation occurred if a man "received" a child
into his household. This interpretation becomes increasingly problematic
when the court goes on to state that "[w]hile the legal status of illegitimacy
has been abolished, the presumption has been retained because it continues
to serve the function of settling questions of biological parenthood. In
essence, it removes the doubt as to the identity of a child's biological
father." 29
The court appears to imply that it is always the biological father
who "receives" the child into his family. However, when this presumption
arises, the man who "holds out the child as his natural child" is not
necessarily the child's biological father. Judicial determinations concerning
"doubt as to the identity" of a child's father are based on an assessment of
a man's behaviour toward a woman and her child and do not always depend
on a finding of biological relatedness. This is the reason for continued
existence of the presumption precisely because courts want to sanction
social relationships between men and women and men and children that
mimic that of the traditional family.
Within Robert's argument about the way in which Cynthia "held
out the child as her natural child," the court read the presumption as only
operating to legitimate a child born outside a legal marriage when
recognized by its "natural" parent. However, Robert attempted to use the
presumption to allow the recognition of a non-biological mother as a legal
parent where she had an established social relationship with the child's
father and the child-thus, the very notion of "holding out" the child as
one's own. The court was not willing to interpret the presumption in this
manner.
The court's notion of the appropriate application of the
presumptions of paternity to a determination of maternity did not result in
the achievement of substantive equality for Cynthia Moschetta. Rather
than construing the presumption as one which also serves to sanction social
relationships between adults and children, the court articulated its
application to the facts in a narrow and asymmetrical manner. By retaining
128 Ibid.
1291bid. at 1226 [emphasis added].
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the requirement of a "natural" (i.e., a genetic or gestational) connection for
a woman to be legally recognized as the mother of a child, the court failed
to recognize the uncertainty of maternity. This uncertainty is similar to the
historically uncertainty of paternity, except the uncertainty of maternity
entails distinctly social and biological components that are not necessarily
situated Athin one woman.
In addition to the fragmentation of maternity along biological lines,
new relationships are being created between women and their non-
biological children. However, judicial recognition of different "kinds" of
mothers with causally different-or apportioned-legal parental rights has
not yet followed. As a result of the decision in Moschetta, courts in the
United States are blatantly willing to accept inequality of result in cases
involving "traditional" and gestational surrogacy. The court of appeal
appeared to accept this result:
... we are not unmindful of the practical effect of our decision in light of Johnson v. Cakrrt.
Infertile couples who can afford the high-tech solution of in vitro fertdization and embryo
implantation in another woman'swornb can be reazonablyassurcd of beingJudgcd the legal
parents of the child, even if the surrogate reneges on her agreement, Coup!es Vho cannot
afford in vitro fertilization and embryo implantation, or ,;ho res ort to traditional surro, acy
because the female does not have eggs suitable for in vitro fertilization, have no aziurance
their intentions will be honoured in a court of law. For them and the child, b:wlo3y is
destiny.'"
The court firmly held that the law, as it stands, "compelled" the
affirmation of the judgment that Robert Moschetta and Elvira Jordan are
Marissa's legal father and mother. I argue, however, that the court felt
compelled because of ashort-sighted interpretation of the current statutory
presumptions of paternity and an ideological predisposition to limit the
maternity presumption to one that is based on the notion of "naturalness."
McDonald v. McDonald13 1 is a divorce case vhere the wife sought
a judicial declaration that she was the natural mother of the two children
of the marriage for the purposes of resolving the issue of custody. Because
she conceived through in vitro fertilization, she was considered the
gestational, not the genetic, mother. The husband sought sole custody of
the children on the grounds that he was the "only genetic and natural
parent available to the children."'-" He asserted that his wife was not the
13 0 Ibid. at 1234-35.
131 196 A.D. 2d 7., online WL (AD) [hereinafter AcDonald.
132 Ibi. at para. 7.
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"natural" mother of the children since she had used donor eggs to become
pregnant. On this basis, he also sought a declaration that the children were
"illegitimate... or, in the alternative, should such children be found to be...
[his], that custody be granted to [him]." 33 The Supreme Court of Queen's
County held that Mrs. McDonald was undisputably the children's birth
mother and granted her full custody pending trial. The Appellate Division
of the supreme court perceived a Johnson-like factual scenario involving a
"true egg donation situation, where a woman gestates and gives birth to a
child formed from the egg of another woman with the intent to raise the
child as her own ... , ..4 This line of reasoning, originating from Johnson
enabled the court to designate Mrs. McDonald the natural mother of the
children. Needless to say, the fact that only one woman is asserting a claim
in McDonald is determinative and provides a crucial contrast to Johnson
and Moschetta.
The case of Jaycee Buzzanca presents a legal conundrum as it
involves up to eight persons to whom parental rights and responsibilities
could be affixed. Jaycee Buzzanca was conceived from the ova of Erin
Davidson, fertilized with the sperm of Mr. X, implanted in the uterus of
Pamela Snell in 1994, and born in 1995. A contract between Pamela Snell
and her husband, and John and Luanne Buzzanca, stated that upon birth
Jaycee was the Buzzancas' child. Four weeks before her birth, John
Buzzanca initiated proceedings to terminate his marriage to Ms. Buzzanca
alleging that the marriage had produced no children. In response, Luanne
Buzzanca countered that the couple was expecting a child by way of a
surrogacy contract and argued that Mr. Buzzanca, as the legal father of the
child, should be responsible for child support. Given the factually
complicated context, uncertainty abounds: Is the mother the woman who
gestated the child and gave birth to her (the traditional answer)? What
about the woman who contributed the ovum? Or the woman who wanted
the child as her own? Is the father the person married to the woman who
gave birth according to the common law? Is he the man who contributed
the sperm? Or, is he the man who was married to the person who
"commissioned" the child?
The trial court determined that Mrs. Buzzanca was not the legal
mother of Jaycee because she had no genetic, gestational, or adoptive
evidence of her status as such. Mr. Buzzanca could not be the legal father
or owe any support also because of his lack of genetic relation to the child
13 3 Ibid. at para. 6.
13 4 Ibid
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and the unwillingness of the court to consider his intent to enter into a
surrogacy arrangement as sufficient evidence of legal paternity. The court
also accepted a stipulation that the surrogate and her husband were not the
"biological parents" of the child. At trial, Mr. Buzzanca did not object to
this stipulation.
In Jaycee B. v. John B.,'- the California Court of Appeal heard
arguments concerning Jaycee's parentage in order to make a ruling
regarding child support.' The court of appeal likened the situation in this
case to the "functional equivalent of a paternity action, where a mother
who is the caretaker of a child seeks court ordered support from a man but
for whose actions the child would never have come into existence."''1' The
legal question for the court to resolve was whether the surrogacy contract
constituted sufficient evidence for finding Mr. Buzzanca Jaycee's father.
Rather than having to determine whether a man was or was not the father
of a child, or whether a marriage had or had not taken place, the court was
faced with the task of resolving the most basic facts of the case since the
dispute did not concern the facts of an agreement, but its legal effect.
In order to determine whether the surrogacy contract was sufficient
evidence of Mr. Buzzanca's paternity, the court referred to Johnson as both
the cases involved gestational surrogacy. However, in Johnson, the
"intended" parents were also the genetic parents and neither Johnson nor
Moschetta established whether surrogacy agreements are enforceable per
se. On the contrary, these cases found that these contracts constituted "a
proper basis on which to ascertain the intent" of the parties.' The
dilemma facing the court was that in order to find that Mr. Buzzanca could
not be the father of the child, the courts would have to find the surrogate
birth mother the "natural"mother or else Jaycee would have no legal
parents. Looking again to Johnson for guidance, the court speculated that
finding Pamela to be the natural mother was unlikely to be the ultimate
result of the case given that the court would be loathe to "burden her with
'responsibilities' she never contemplated and is directly 'contrary to her
135 42 Cal. App. 4h 718 (1996)[hereinafterJ..cce B),
136 After a complicated determination regarding juridicttonal compatency, the court ofapp-al
felt that its job was not to decide the actual paternityof Jaycce and it made a temraryorder againt
Mr. Buzzanca for child support. Awrit was then requested, directing the famtl4 law court to determine
an appropriate child support order.
137 Jaycee B.. supra note 135 at 721.
138 Ibid. at 701.
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expectations .... .,,t39 The court also felt that since Jaycee's genetic parents
were anonymous, they too were unlikely to be deemed the "natural
parents."
Therefore, and as dictated by Johnson, the court turned its attention
to the intention of the parties in the hope that this type of surrogacy case
would be unique and that they could ascertain a rule recognizing the
intending parents as the child's legal, natural parents in compliance with the
best interests of the child. Using the "intention test,"the court reasoned
that Mr. Buzzanca's signing of the surrogacy agreement showed, "by a
preponderance of the evidence," that he would likely be held to be Jaycee's
father.140 Based upon the urgency of Jaycee's need for financial support,
and upon the parental responsibilities contemplated by the surrogacy
contract, the court ruled that, at first blush, the fact that Mr. Buzzanca
signed the surrogacy agreement was sufficient to give the family court
jurisdiction to hear the order to show cause.
Re Marriage of Buzzanca14' determined the actual parentage of
Jaycee. The court of appeal held that the trial court erred in its decision
that Jaycee had no lawful parents since "Jaycee never would have been
born had not Luanne and John both agreed to have a fertilized egg
implanted in a surrogate., 142 Justice Sills held that the trial judge erred in
his conclusion that legal motherhood could only be established by giving
birth or through the contribution of an egg. He cited the well established
body of law in which fatherhood can be established irrespective of birth or
genetic relation but based upon conduct, a rule which was consistent with
Johnson and which the court thought should apply in this case:
Just as a husband is deemed to be the lawful father of a child unrelated to him when his wife
gives birth after artificial insemination, so should a husband and wife be deemed the lawful
parents of a child after a surrogate bears a biologically unrelated child on their behalf. In
each instance, a child is procreated because a medical procedure was initiated and
consented to by intended parents. The only difference is that in this case-unlike artificial
insemination-there is no reason to distinguish between husband and wife."
The court then reversed the decision of the trial court and declared Mr. and
Mrs. Buzzanca the legal parents of Jaycee.
139 Ibi.at 701 referring to Johnson.
140 Jaycee B, supra note 135 at 702.
141 61 Cal. App. 4th 1410 (1998) [hereinafter Buzzanca].
142 Ibid. at 1411.
143Ibid. at 1412.
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On appeal, Mr. Buzzanca argued that the surrogate was, in fact,
Jaycee's legal mother because, under the uR4, only tvo ways to establish
legal maternity edst: giving birth and genetic contribution. The anonymity
of the egg donor meant that the surrogate must be deemed the child's legal
mother. However, the court held that the proper interpretation of the
statute did not mandate such a determination. In addition to the two tests
which apply in situations of maternity, the UP.4 also allows paternity to be
established by presumption or as a result of artificial insemination."' The
court held that artificial insemination by donor, and gestational surrogacy
are analogous in that they both "contemplate the procreation of a child by
the consent to a medical procedure of someone who intends to raise the
child but who otherwise does not have any biological tie.""
Mrs. Buzzanca was found to be situated similarly to a husband in an
artificial insemination case whose consent has triggered a medical
procedure which results in a pregnancy and eventual birth of a child. By
virtue of her consent to the procedure, the court affirmed her maternity
claim and denied Mr. Buzzanca's claim that the surrogate should be
declared the legal mother. By situating Mrs. Buzzanca according to both
the statutory and common law positions regarding artificial insemination,
the court analogized the Buzzancas' situation to that found in Johnson.
Both Mrs. Buzzanca, and the surrogate had equal claims to maternity under
the UPA, but, as per Johnson, the "tie" was broken by an examination of
intention and Mrs. Buzzanca was clearly the intending mother. The court
also affirmed that if the egg donor should assert a claim of maternity, Mrs.
Buzzanca's maternity would remain established, again on the basis of her
intention.
Regarding Mr. Buzzanca's paternity, the court held that "the same
reasons which impel us to conclude that Luanne is Jaycee's lawful mother
also require that John be declared Jaycee's lawful father.""' Practically, and
even notwithstanding the existence of the surrogacy contract, Mr. Buzzanca
caused Jaycee's conception and he was therefore properly held to be her
legal father. The court even went so far as to dismiss Mr. Buzzanca's future
claim upon appeal that since Mrs. Buzzanca had promised to assume all
responsibility for the child, he should not have been found the child's
144 Note that the court states that it made sense not to apply the provisions contauing, p3tcrrty
presumptionsinMoschetta because theymvwereonlypresumptwons, therebyscho-angthat theycomp:tecl
overlook the implications of the social and relational aspzcts of the maternity argument,
145 Buzzanca, supra note 141 at 1415.
146 Ibid. at 1419.
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father. This promise, according to the court, makes no difference to his
legal paternity because it is well established that parents cannot, by
agreement limit or subrogate a child's right to support.147 Regardless of
whether Mrs. Buzzanca had actually become pregnant, Mr. Buzzanca had
engaged in "procreative conduct." 148 Accordingly, the court of appeal
reversed the declarations that Mrs. Buzzanca was not Jaycee's legal mother
and that Mr. Buzzanca was not Jaycee's legal father.
The maternity cases examined in this section demonstrate the
rigidity of the legal construction of maternity as "natural." They show how
the legal construction of maternity requires the presence of a biological tie
even in light of alternative constructions of the maternal relationship. Cases
like Moschetta create an opportunity for the courts to expand the legal
construction of maternity to encompass new relationships, but, thus far, the
courts have largely declined to do so unless the result they can obtain
mirrors a traditional family norm. McDonald shows how the determinations
of maternity differ when there is only one woman asserting a claim and this
suggests that the courts will rarely acknowledge that maternity is, or ought
to be, divided; Buzzanca seems to confirm this conclusion. Finally, although
the intentional theory of parenthood provided the just result in Buzzanca,
this finding could create problems in future cases when a genetically
unrelated surrogate does want to assert rights against intentional parents
and fails to recognize and value the different contribution that gestation
makes by placing all maternal rights and responsibilities in one woman.
V. CONCLUSION
Closeness of biogenetic identity has, for many years, symbolized
degrees of closeness between kin.'49 However, kinship could always be
separated from family as an institution based on conjugal relationships and
the rearing of children. A child born between two people linked them as
kin. Presently new actors associated with reproductive medicine create a
new field of relationships that does not overlap with traditional family
relationships. Kinship has become dispersed. The child produced does not
necessarily link those who will be its parents and often it brings in other
14 7 Ibid, at 1420.
148 Ibid.
149"Displacing Knowledge," supra note 21 at 351.
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people through the act of assisted procreation." D As a result, there is now
a field of "procreators" whose relationship to one another is a result of
procreation rather thanfamily. Through assisted reproduction, procreation
is separated from sexuality and from the body and "unrelated" others51 t are
introduced to the procreative process by making it possible for women and
men to have children without a heterosexual partner. An expansion of
parenthood should necessarily follow as a result of the number of
contributions to the conception; however, it has been shown that this is
often not the case.
Parenthood is a hybrid of natural, social, and cultural factors. These
factors, however, have been construed by law in a gendered manner. The
modem movement to reform family law in accordance vth the principles
of freedom of contract and gender equality has changed the context of
filiation, but has not changed many of its underlying power asymmetries.
Formal gender and race equality exists between the claims of "paternity"
and "maternity" but the same cultural asymmetries continue to operate
with respect to the ways in which the legal categories are constructed. Thus,
the results have been characterized by the visible reification of the
normative heterosexual, two-parent family structure. Alternative family
forms created with the aid of technology will achieve legal recognition only
if the ideological underpinnings of the categories of filiation are reformed.
At the same time, by revealing the asymmetries of legal filiation, the ARTs
can help put to rest the gendered legal fictions constructed around the
alleged facts of nature by providing an opportunity and a means for the
courts to expand the concept of parenthood and extend legal recognition
of the number of parents a child may have to more than two.
150 This notion, referred to as, "dispersed kinship," includes thoze vho"preduce" the chdd v, th
assistance as well as those who assist. Ibid. at 352.
151 C Calhoun, "Family's Outlaws: Rethinking the ConnecttonsHBet cen Feminism, Lebianism
and the Family" in H.L Nelson, ed., Feminism andFanhds (New York: Routlcdge. 1997)131 at 143
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